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ABSTRACT
We provide enhanced security against insider attacks in services
that manage extremely sensitive data. One example is a #MeToo
use case where sexual harassment complaints are reported but only
revealed when another complaint is filed against the same perpe-
trator. Such a service places tremendous trust on service operators
which our work aims to relieve.
To this end we introduce a new autonomous data management
concept which transfers responsibility for the sensitive data from
administrators to secure and verifiable hardware. The main idea
is to manage all data access via a cluster of autonomous computa-
tion agents running inside Intel SGX enclaves. These EConfidante
agents share a secret data key which is unknown to any external
entity, including the data service administrators, thus eliminating
many opportunities for data exposure. In this paper we describe
a detailed design of the EConfidante system, its flow and how it
is managed and implemented. Our #MeToo design also uses an
immutable distributed ledger which is built using components from
a Blockchain framework. We implemented a proof of concept of our
system for the #MeToo use case and analyze its security properties
and implementation details.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The protection of sensitive data is a central security concern for
any organization retaining and utilizing such data. Indeed, there
are numerous protection mechanisms, including encryption, access
control and virtual or physical data isolation. A key weakness is re-
liance on a centralized entity that is entrusted with the management
of the IT system, its health, scalability and availability. Typically,
IT administrators have nearly limitless access to data or privileges
to bypass or change the software for managing it. The existence of
powerful privileged users in a system leaves an opening for foul
play, whether by a rogue employee or via hacking and hijacking of
secret privileged credentials.
History has shown that such trust can, and has been, breached,
whether maliciously or not. Incidents of data theft by authorized
persons have been abundant, with some high profile data breaches
such as the Snowden leaks. Data leaks continue to plague various
organizations, be it by a disgruntled employee, inadvertent error,
or by hacking of accounts of individuals that have the credentials
to override the security obstacles instated for data protection.1
Finally, many of defence mechanisms are implemented in software
1In fact, it has been documented that a majority of the security breaches have come
from inside organizations.[22]
and can be bypassed by administrators with direct access to the
underlying hardware. This work attempts to significantly reduce the
ability of rogue employees or hackers to extract sensitive data from
systems that are charged with maintaining and handling sensitive
information.
At the core of our work is a new autonomous data management
concept – transferring the responsibility for data from administra-
tors to secure hardware. A good analogy would be entrusting data
to a robot that is both autonomous yet always truthful to its cause.
By Autonomous we mean that it cannot be influenced or inspected
by any external party. A second property is that it does only what
it was programmed to do, it is robotic in the non-creative sense of
the word. Our instantiation of the autonomous and trustworthy
robot builds on new hardware paradigms for secure execution, and
specifically on Intel’s SGX technology [6].
This approach conceptually has wide applicability as a security
enhancement, but is especially beneficial for targeted applications
that maintain highly sensitive data and in which, for the most part,
the data never leaves the confines of the secure repository. One
such example is a MeToo use case, in which sexual harassment
complaints are registered in confidence under the understanding
that they will not be reported to authorities unless there are at
least two matching complaints against the same perpetrator. Such
services already exist, e.g. Callisto [12] and “One of One" [9], but
they put extremely high trust in their operators and administrators.
This use case is discussed in depth in Section 2 along with other
relevant applications.
The basic idea is to have all sensitive data encrypted with a key
that is known only to software running inside Intel SGX Enclaves.
Enclaves are special computation modes in Intel Skylake processors
that run all computations on encrypted data. Coupled with a remote
attestation capability (a code and platform verification mechanism),
the enclaves can serve as the desired robot for executing all data re-
lated operations. Our aim is to ensure that the key to the encrypted
data only resides inside an EConfidante agent running in an enclave
and therefore the encrypted data can only be useful if accessed via
the enclave. In a sense, we are replacing the parts of the privileged
software that actually handle the data by robotic code running in a
secure execution environment.
Contributions: We present a detailed architecture and design
of the EConfidante system and analyze the security properties it
achieves. We complement the cluster of EConfidante agents, which
are responsible for keeping the encryption key secret, with addi-
tional mechanisms to ensure data survivability, immutability, audit-
ing capabilities and control over the cluster. We build an immutable
distributed ledger in which the agents share data. The Ledger is
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built using HyperLedger Fabric, a framework for Blockchain appli-
cations, and is run by the system administrators that are entrusted
with controlling the cluster. These administrators also run a lease
based control ecosystem for creating, running and maintaining the
agent cluster. Our design is such that a single rogue administrator
(or a configurable number of rogue administrators) cannot manipu-
late the data in the ledger or the makeup of the EConfidante cluster.
We stress that the management’s responsibility is to support and
control the cluster, but even a fully malicious management can-
not retrieve the secret key from the EConfidante agents without
breaking the security of the SGX technology.
We implemented a proof of concept of an EConfidante system
for the MeToo use case built on Intel SGX hardware and using the
HyperLedger Fabric code base. We report implementation details,
lessons learned and performance attributes of our PoC.
Paper Outline: Section 2 discusses the MeToo use case as well
as other interesting data services. Section 3 presents background
regarding the Intel SGX technology and HyperLedger Fabric. In
section 4 we present a high level overview of our design and its
goals while in Section 5 we present a detailed account of this design.
The implementation is described in section 6 and Section 7 describes
related work. Appendix A provides security properties of theMeToo
implementation and Appendix B contains additional discussion on
design and implementation.
2 USE CASES
In this paper we focus on protection of centrally managed sen-
sitive data against the privileged user threat, to provide addi-
tional protection against data leakage. This section details several
use cases. We focus on the #MeToo use case, and also mention
genomics and biometric database use cases.
2.1 The #MeToo Use Case
Since October, the phrase “Me Too”, originally coined by Tarana
Burke and popularized as a hashtag by Alyssa Milano, has been
tweeted over 1.7 million times. The hashtag went viral in the wake
of sexual harassment allegations against Hollywood mogul Harvey
Weinstein. Why have victims been silent until now, and why has
the #MeToo campaign become so intensely viral? Sexual assault
victims risk significant damage and often obtain no clear benefit
for providing their testimonies. It takes two to #MeToo and some-
one had to be first #MeToo shows the immense power of bringing
together victims of the same offender.
Recently software systems such as Callisto[12] have been de-
ployed to help victims of sexual assault record and possibly report
offences. Callisto allows private documentation of the incident,
with the option to release the records to authorities if the complaint
matches another complaint for the same perpetrator. Similarly, the
‘One of One’ non-profit organization maintains a website and an
encrypted repository of alleged sexual harassers and (only) uses
this information to notify victims of the existence of matching
complaints [9]. Callisto uses algorithmic processes to perform the
matching and notifications[4] whereas for One of One this process
is manual. However in both cases, privileged administrators have
access to complaints which requires considerable trust because this
information could be hacked or leaked. 2 Documented evidence of
sexual harassment is extremely private data, and if leaked in an
untimely fashion it can cause permanent lifelong damage. While
efforts are made to secure the data, all systems today are susceptible
to data leakage caused by human error and insider attacks, simply
because there are humans involved with access to the data.
Beyond insider attacks, there is also a risk that data can be re-
quested by court order using a subpoena process. The fact that
Callisto users can document an assault but choose not to report
it may have legal ramifications. Are the Callisto administrators
considered to be in possession of this data? Could they be held re-
sponsible for refraining to take action to prevent further incidents?
A unique feature of EConfidante is that, unless there is a match, it is
impossible to gain access to the data, even when all administrators
are malicious.3
Figure 1: Flows for the #MeToo use case
Our main goal is to enhance the security of such systems so
that unmatched allegations can be stored securely and indefinitely
without ever being viewed by a human other than their author,
while still guaranteeing them to be continuously matched against
recent allegations. In our work we do not address issues that con-
cern registration and identity questions, and issues related to false
accusations. We refer the reader to [9, 12] on such matters. We also
do not define who the authorities are. Rather we consider the model
of operation depicted in Figure 1 and devise mechanisms to secure
it. The main flows for this use case are:
(1) User registers with EConfidante and submits information
about sexual assault, which is encrypted by EConfidante
using a unique key known only to EConfidante and stored
in the system.
(2) Periodically an EConfidante agent checks for matching
perpetrators.
(3) A periodic encrypted message is sent to the authorities
containing any new matching complaints.
2A new version of Callisto is under development which attempts to mitigate this[49]
using a different approach than ours. We cover this in our Related Work section
(Section 7).
3Under our trust assumptions which are covered in Sections 4.1 and A.
2
A side note is that the message to the authorities is of constant
length (even if empty), to avoid leaking information about whether
recent matches were found.
2.2 Biometric Databases
In this use case, personal biometric data is stored by a central
authority for means of identification of individuals. Adding new
biometric information to such a repository is a natural operation,
for example, recording fingerprints of a new citizen. On the other
hand, extracting biometric data should not be supported. Rather,
the only information that should leave the database is an answer
whether a given fingerprint matches an existing entry or not.
2.3 The Genomics Use Case
An increasing number of B2B bioinformatics data platforms[11, 13]
and B2C services [8, 10, 15] offer storage of genomic data and (plat-
forms for) value added services such as genetic screening, ethnicity
analysis and kindred search. While this data is extremely sensi-
tive and its inadvertent leakage is irrevocable, platforms managing
it have not been immune to hackers[16]. Running these services
where genomes are always encrypted and only accessed via ECon-
fidante enclaves offers much stronger privacy to individuals adding
their data to the service. A key difference between this use case and
MeToo include the sheer size of the data and amount of resources
required to process it, and while memory and other limitations for
Intel SGX are deterrents today, these barriers will likely be over-
come over time. Finally, a requirement of the genomics use case
is to support an unanticipated set of genomic analytics capabili-
ties. To handle such a use case the EConfidante system should be
extended to handle a flexible set of digitally signed and attested
functionalities. This is similar to the functional encryption model
with enclaves described in Iron[33], where the role of EConfidante
would be to manage the encryption keys.
3 BACKGROUND
3.1 SGX and Enclaves
Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [44] is a set of instruc-
tions on some of Intel’s latest X86 platforms which aims to allow
application developers to run parts of their code in a protected,
isolated fashion [36]. These instructions create execution environ-
ments called Enclaves which run in secluded memory areas and use
hardware based encryption to the content of memory used by the
enclave process. There are many details on SGX’s implementation
and usage (e.g. on the SGX web-site [6] or in detailed studies [32]).
Here we give a very brief overview while focusing on the central
relevant properties.
At a high level, the two main features of SGX are Isolation and
Attestation. Isolation is a process’ ability to run in a secluded man-
ner where other processes, even with high privileges, cannot read
its memory pages or modify them. Attestation is the ability to prove
to external parties a) that the code is running inside an Intel SGX
enclave, and b) that specific code is being executed in the enclave. In
addition, SGX supports a sealing operation which allows an enclave
to store its encrypted state on persistent storage and later retrieve
it and continue operation (on the same machine only).
SGX Attestation: The attestation process (described in [17]) en-
tails the creation of an attestation quote of an enclave which is
signed using a key that exists only in platforms with Intel SGX (the
signature is an asymmetric signature scheme, and more precisely a
ring signature called EPID [28]). The quote signature can then be
verified by contacting an Intel Attestation Service (IAS). The attes-
tation quote includes a measurement over the enclave to be verified.
This measurement, denoted MRENCLAVE, is essentially a crypto-
graphic hash of the enclave’s memory pages (reflecting its code
during its creation). The quote also includes various information
about the platform, the creator of the enclave and most importantly
a field for additional user data. This user data can be used to store
a public key (generated by the enclave) for all future identification
and communication with the enclave. Once an attestation process
has completed, the enclave being attested has a publicly verifiable
IAS report (which can be verified using an IAS public key). The
IAS report includes the content of the quote and serves as proof
that an enclave with the corresponding measurement is indeed
executing in an Intel SGX platform and that it can be identified and
communicated with using the corresponding enclave’s public key.
SGX usage limitations: There are strict limitations on the code
running inside SGX enclaves, in particular, code needs to be written
in C/C++ and system calls cannot be made. An enclave therefore
is made out of code running inside the enclave, and wrapper code
running outside the enclave, making ECALLs to functions within
the enclave (defined in an "edl" file). This wrapper is usually referred
to as the untrusted part of the SGX code. The untrusted part handles
communication between the enclave and peripherals (e.g. network,
storage).
The SGX framework also comes with significant limitations on
the amount of memory an enclave is allocated, after which paging
from the enclave designated memory area (the Enclave Page Cache)
to the general memory needs to occur (hence affecting performance,
see [19, 47, 52]). Currently the limit of the enclave page cache is
128MB.
Attacks on SGX: Although great efforts have been made to isolate
an enclave process from its environment, numerous side channel
attacks have been demonstrated, (e.g.[25, 31, 32, 34, 42, 46, 50, 51]).
Mitigation of such attacks has been discussed at length in the afore-
mentioned studies and we consider these beyond the scope of our
work. Our use of enclaves adheres to best practice guidelines for
avoiding side channel attacks and the main security claim assumes
that code running in enclaves is indeed secure.
That said, our general approach to using SGX enclaves is that
they should be an additional line of defence rather than replacing
existing security mechanisms. By doing so we can assure that in
case of an enclave security breach, the level of trust in the system
falls back to the security mechanisms that predated the use of SGX
enclaves. In our case this means that the security falls back to
trust in the system administrators (as it was before introducing
EConfidante ).
3
3.2 The HyperLedger Fabric Blockchain
Framework
HyperLedger Fabric (or simply Fabric) [5, 18] is a platform for dis-
tributed ledger solutions. It is one of the HyperLedger open source
projects hosted by The Linux Foundation and is designed to sup-
port pluggable implementations of different components such as
consensus and membership services. HyperLedger Fabric leverages
container technology to host smart contracts called “chaincode”
that comprise the application logic of the system. We use the frame-
work to maintain an immutable distributed ledger (which serves
as shared storage) that can be queried for the latest state (thereby
preventing replay attacks) and can be verified inside SGX enclaves.
See Section 5.2 for details.
4 DESIGN OVERVIEW
4.1 Security Goals
As mentioned in the introduction, our system targets mitigating
insider attacks including attacks by one or more rogue administra-
tors. The specific security requirements vary from one use case to
another, yet we put forward common mechanisms that have a wide
applicability.
The central concept of our system is to rely on SGX technology
to form a cluster of autonomous processes that manage data and
all access to it. This is achieved by encrypting all sensitive data
with a secret key (the econf_key) which is known only inside the
EConfidante enclaves, hence rendering data useless unless accessed
via an enclave. We classify this as the secrecy property that our
system provides and is the most important cornerstone of our
system. However, there are additional security requirements that
are needed and we discuss these as well. The main security goals
are listed below in order of importance.
• Secrecy: The main goal is to provide secrecy for the data
stored and handled by the system and our system provides
strong guarantees based solely on the integrity of the En-
clave hardware. Namely, the secrecy property holds even
in face of an adversary that corrupts all of the system ad-
ministrators.4 Note that in case of an SGX security breach,
the secrecy falls back to what it would be in a regular de-
ployment. Namely, the data remains secure as long as no
administrator is corrupted.
The formal definition of data secrecy depends on the
application since some applications are expected to divulge
some data as part of their functionality. A general security
statement that applies to all use cases therefore focuses
on the secrecy of the cluster’s key (econf_key), or more
precisely, states that the security of data encrypted with
this key is not diminished even in the presence of mali-
cious administrators. For the MeToo use case we guaran-
tee the secrecy of all complaints. Complaints that have
matches are sent to the authorities in an encrypted mes-
sage, whereas the details of complaints that do not have
matches are never decrypted outside an EConfidante agent.
4Note that protection in face of corruption of all administrators assumes that the
ability to upgrade enclave code requires additional permissions. See Section B.2 for
details.
The formal guarantees for this use case will be discussed
in Appendix A.
• Immutability:An important property for an EConfidante
system is that data or state that was ingested by EConfi-
dante agents cannot be changed or reversed. For the MeToo
use-case this property is critical - it guarantees that com-
plaints that were accepted by the system cannot be ignored,
lost or erased. Our system is built to provide a guarantee
that two matching complaints will indeed be reported to
the authorities, as long as both received an ack from an
EConfidante agent. This property is hard to achieve based
on enclave technology, since enclaves have limited support
for holding verifiable persistent state and may be rolled
back to a previous state. Instead, we ensure this property
by building an immutable distributed ledger, using the Hy-
perLedger Fabric blockchain framework as the underlying
technology. The distributed trust is guaranteed against any
adversary that does not control at least k out of n adminis-
trators (for k and n of our choice).
• Cluster control: The key secrecy property is guaranteed
by the EConfidante enclaves themselves, no matter how
many of these are spawned. Still we invest efforts in con-
trolling the number of running EConfidante agents that
make up a cluster. There are several reasons for this: e.g.,
ensuring an orderly inception of the cluster, supporting
orderly upgrades of enclave firmware/code, avoiding a split
cluster or having “shadow agents" – legitimate EConfidante
agents which are removed from the main cluster and used
on the side by a rogue administrator to support enumer-
ation attacks, side channel attacks or simply undetected
access to the data service. Our design for this is based on
a lease mechanism by which each EConfidante agent will
only perform its operation if it receives a lease to do so by
at least k out of n administrators.
The lease mechanism also ties in with our auditing sup-
port in which the process of renewing a lease for an agent
is restricted to agents who left a valid log and incident free
log (and this log was not tampered with). See Section B.3
for more information on the logging support.
• Survivability: Closely related to immutability, data sur-
vivability requires that both the data in the ledger is main-
tained, and the EConfidante agents that hold the econf_key
are available (otherwise the encrypted data becomes use-
less). This property can be ensured even against a malicious
administrator that attempts to launch a permanent denial
of service attack, as long as k out of n enclaves behave
properly (see details in Section B.1).
We emphasize that our design serves as a significant security
enhancement to existing mechanisms but does not replace them
altogether. For example, a MeToo application without enclaves will
use strict access control policies to protect sensitive data and these
policies and access control mechanisms must remain in place once
the EConfidante cluster is introduced. This ensures that in case of
a breach of the SGX technology (e.g. by new side channel attacks),
the system falls back to existing mechanisms where administrators
are entrusted with data secrecy.
4
4.2 Architecture
We next describe the main building blocks comprising an EConfi-
dante solution as they are depicted in Figure 2:
EConfidante
Management
Immutable Ledger
IAS
Clients
Admin 1
EConfidante Cluster
EC 1 EC 2 EC 3 EC 4Admin 2
Admin 4
Admin 3
EC 5
Figure 2: The EConfidante system architecture.
Administrators: At a high level, we view our system as being
managed by a number of administrator entities. Each administrator
has full access rights to manage the EConfidante cluster’s resources
(servers and network) so they can handle any maintenance and
liveliness issues. But administrators should also have dedicated re-
sources that cannot be accessed by the other administrators. These
will be used for the immutable ledger and for producing leases. In
particular, we assume that each administrator has a its own public
and secret key-pair. In the following, we assume that n is the num-
ber of administrators and we denote by (adm_pk[i], adm_sk[i]) the
key-pair of the i’th administrator.
Intel Attestation service (IAS): This is the external service in
which SGX enclaves are attested to and is provided by Intel [17, 37].
The attestation reports signed by the IAS can later be verified by
all components in our system, and specifically by the EConfidante
agents themselves. An IAS attestation report is constituted of an
enclave quote and a signature on this quote signed by the IAS. The
report can be verified using the IAS pubic key ias_pk.
EConfidante agents:As alreadymentioned, the backbone of ECon-
fidante is a collection of enclave agents sharing a (symmetric) secret
key econf_key. The fact that they run in enclaves ensures their se-
curity whether they run in a trusted or untrusted environment.5
There are two-types of agents: A leader agent and a regular agent.
The leader agent is responsible for creating the econf_key for the
first time, and for sharing it with other (regular) agents. The other
agents are responsible for receiving the econf_key from some agent
(leader or regular) and sharing the econf_key with other agents
which is critical for the survivability of the econf_key. Moreover,
they are responsible for the workload at hand. In the MeToo use-
case, we divide these responsibilities into two new roles: A writer
agent and a scanner agent. The writer agent is responsible for re-
ceiving clients’ complaints and writing them into the immutable
ledger. A scanner agent is responsible for periodically performing
5Although off premise enclaves may be more susceptible to side channel attacks.
an offline scan of the ledger and finding new complaints that match,
and for informing the authorities of such matches. An important
property of our implementation is that all types of agents share the
same code-base. An agent’s role is only determined after it receives
signed leases from k out of n administrators that specify whether it
should act as a leader or as regular agent, and whether it should act
as a writer or a scanner. Although the agents are (almost) stateless
given a set of leases that specify their role, we use the sealing mech-
anism of SGX for saving an encrypted copy of econf_key on disk.
This enables the agent to recover after a reboot without receiving
the econf_key again from other agents.
The immutable ledger: This distributed ledger is managed and
run by the administrators and is used as shared storage for ECon-
fidante agents. It has the properties that an enclave reading from
the ledger can be assured to get consistent up to date state, and
in particular, the enclave will not accept old responses (that were
previously accepted but no longer reflect the current state). We note
that by design, the ledger is a distributed entity which requires in-
teraction between several nodes for each update or query. As such,
its performance is expected to be limited and this is indeed the case
with our actual implementation (Section 6). Therefore, the ledger is
suitable for any information that requires immutability guarantees,
but should be used sparsely due to its performance overhead. In
the MeToo use case the ledger is used to store all complaints (this is
reasonable since the number of complaints should be manageable).
In other use cases (e.g. the biometric database) data can be stored
in local storage or alternative shared storage.
Clients: The clients represent users of the system. For example,
in the MeToo use-case they represent victims of incidents that
report complaints.6 Clients interact with the EConfidante agents
via secure communication based on the agent’s public keys. There
is no inherent limitation on how they are deployed, on what system
and in what language they are implemented. In our implementation
we provide clients with a means to verify an EConfidante agent’s
attestation report in order to ensure that they are indeed reporting
their complaints to a genuine EConfidante agent running inside an
SGX enclave.
4.3 Putting it all Together
We briefly describe how all these components fit together. EConfi-
dante agents receive complaints from clients and register these in
the ledger. Periodically (e.g. once a day), a scanner agent retrieves
all complaints from the ledger and scans for matches, and any
new matches are written in an encrypted message which is sent
to the authorities. The message is of fixed size, so it does not leak
information in encrypted form. EConfidante agents are also respon-
sible for handing the econf_key to their fellow agents, ensuring the
liveliness of the key.
EConfidante agents are programmed to run only if they have
up to date leases from a sufficient number of administrators. The
administrators managing the EConfidante agents are responsible
6In the MeToo use case clients should have some form of registration and identification.
We view these logistics as out of the scope of our paper and refer the reader to the
Callisto project [12, 49] for an example of handling such issues.
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for controlling the cluster and ensuring its liveliness. In regular
operation, there is a fixed set of agents and the administrators have
automatic scripts for lease renewal. However in cases of cluster
growth, or permanent node/enclave failure, a new enclave needs to
be created. This is done by a single administrator but requires the
involvement of other administrators in creating leases for the new
enclave (k out ofn administrators are sufficient). The administrators
also run the distributed ledger and are in charge of cluster inception.
The main components and flow of our design are described in
detail in the next section. Due to space limitations, the description
of additional mechanisms for key survivability, software upgrades,
scanner functionality and logging are described in Appendix B.
5 DETAILS AND FLOWS
In this sectionwe dive into the details of our system and describe the
various data flows between the various components. This includes
the initial cluster inception, the attestation phase, key transfer
protocol and the client agent interactions.
Initial EConfidante Agent Code Creation: As in most cases
with enclaves, a base assumption is that the code for the EConfi-
dante enclaves is developed, tested, audited, compiled and agreed
on and we can assume that it is correct. Before compilation, some
important keys are hard coded into the enclave code. Then, the code
is compiled once, and the resulting shared-object file (denote by
econf_enclave.so) is published together with its mr_enclave mea-
surement (denote by econf_mr_enclave).
In Table 1 we list the main security parameters held by the ECon-
fidante agent together with the phase in which they are obtained.
In particular the IAS’s public key ias_pk and the administrator’s
public-keys adm_pk[1], ..., adm_pk[n] are hard coded before com-
pilation.
Agent Creation and Attestation:We next describe the process
by which an administrator creates a new EConfidante agent. The
administrator first copies the agent binaries (including the file
econf_enclave.so) to an SGX supported machine and then executes
the agent. The operations that occur upon running the agent are
described in Figure 3. Recall that an SGX application is made out
of two parts: the enclave and the untrusted part. The untrusted
part creates the agent-enclave and starts the attestation-phase.
A key-pair (agent_pk, agent_sk) is generated inside the enclave
and the agent creates and publishes a publicly verifiable report
(IAS report) that binds the value of agent_pk into it by storing its
agent_id inside the user data of the signed attestation quote, where
agent_id = hash(agent_pk). In addition, the agent also signs and
publishes a trusted-time that has been generated inside the enclave
using a special Intel function sgx_get_trusted_time.7 This trusted
time will later be used for producing time-limited leases from the
administrators.
5.1 Operation Flows
5.1.1 Cluster Inception. The inception of an EConfidante
cluster is susceptible to various attacks such as the creation of a split
7The trusted-time is a concatenation of the time itself (8 bytes) together with a time-
nonce (32 bytes) provided by sgx_get_trusted_time.
Agent untrusted part: Agent enclave:
1) Create agent enclave.
2) Call ECALL_attest_phase −−→ 3) Generate key-pair
(agent_pk, agent_sk) and create
a self SGX-report r with
r .user_data = agent_id, where
agent_id = hash(agent_pk).
4) Get trusted time t and sign it
using agent_sk.
←−− 5) Output (t, agent_pk, r ).
6) Transform r into a signed
attestation quote q.
7) Send q to IAS and receive
signed ias_report that contains q .
8) Publish
(t, agent_pk, ias_report).
Figure 3: The flow of agent creation and attestation.
cluster. Due to this vulnerability, we take a cautious approach for
cluster inception bywhich only a fully successful setup is acceptable
and any failure results in full abortion of the process and restart
from scratch.
In this phase the secret key econf_key should be generated in-
side a single EConfidante agent enclave and then shared with all
other EConfidante agents. However, it needs to be decided which
agent actually generates the key from a set of agents that must have
the exact same enclave code (which is a crucial property for our so-
lution as we argue next). Rather than implementing complex leader
election code inside the agent enclaves, we elect to have this pro-
cess handled at the administrator level using the lease mechanism.
After the attestation phase, the agent waits until it receives signed
leases from at least k out of the n administrators. Each administra-
tor i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} should send a signed lease ℓid [i] using its secret
key adm_sk[i]. As described in Table 2, a lease should contain the
admin-id i , the agent-id id (a hash over the agent’s public key), the
role of the agent (whether it should be a leader or not and whether
it should be a writer or scanner), the agent’s trusted time and an
expiration time (e.g., one day). In addition, a lease also contains its
creation time (with respect to the administrator’s clock) which can
be used for additional non-enclave’s verifications (e.g., by the un-
trusted part of an agent in the key-transfer protocol, and by client
software in the client-agent interaction). When the agent-enclave
receives enough leases with valid signatures (at least k), it is now
allowed to operate as long as the expiration time of at least k leases
has not yet been reached (with respect to its trusted time). If the
role that has been specified in all k leases is a leader role, then this
is the enclave that randomly generates the econf_key. Non-leader
agents receive an IP address of an agent that holds the econf_key,
and then the two agents start interacting in a key-transfer protocol,
as described in Section 5.1.2. At the end of this phase all agents hold
the econf_key in their enclave’s (encrypted) memory. At this point,
the enclave stores its key-pair (agent_pk, agent_sk) and econf_key
using the SGX sealing mechanism. This creates an encrypted file
on disk that can be used by the agent to recover after a reboot. In
addition, all the received leases are also stored on disk (without
encryption, since they do not contain sensitive information). Once
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Parameter Explanation Initialization phase
ias_pk Intel Report Signing Public Key for Attestation
Hard codedadm_pk[1], . . . , adm_pk[n] Administrators’ Public Keys
econf_mr_enclave Measurement of the agent-enclave’s code After Compilation
agent_pk, agent_sk Self public-secret key pair Attestation Phase
agent_id hash over agent_pk
ias_report Agent IAS report that bind its mr_enclave and agent_pk.
ℓid [1], . . . , ℓid [n] Leases from all admins for agent with aдent_id = id Setup Phase
econf_key The EConfidante Secret Key
Table 1: EConfidante agent main parameters and the phases at which they are obtained.
agent_id admin_id role creation_time base_trusted_time expiration sig_len sig
32 bytes 4 bytes 4 bytes 8 bytes 40 bytes 8 bytes 4 bytes sig_len bytes
Table 2: The structure of a signed lease
a lease has expired, the administrator should renew the lease. In
Section B.3 we suggest a way to decide whether to renew a lease
based on our logging mechanism.
5.1.2 Key Transfer Between Agents. The most critical part
in the life cycle of our system is the ability to securely transfer
the econf_key from one agent-enclave to another. This is the only
situation in which the econf_key is transferred to another entity.
The receiver must only receive the econf_key from a trusted sender
(to prevent a fake econf_key). More importantly, the sender must
only securely transmit its econf_key to a trusted receiver. Figure 4
describes the flow of our key-transfer protocol. At the first step,
the agents send each other all their publicly verifiable informa-
tion. This includes their agent_pk and mr_enclave measurement
together with their ias_report that binds these values into it, and
also includes signed leases from at leastk administrators. Next, each
agent verifies the information of the other agent (using its own
mr_enclave as the expected_mr_enclave) and computes a (shared)
secret-key based on its own secret-key and the other agent’s public-
key.8 Finally, the sending agent uses the shared secret-key to send
econf_key to the receiving agent using authenticated encryption.
Observe that the verification step must be executed inside the agent-
enclave and not in the agent’s untrusted part. Therefore, we imple-
mented verification code that can be executed inside SGX enclaves.
The following pseudo-code describes the verification steps:
Algorithm 5.1 (VerPubInfo).
Input: agent_pk, ias_report, leases and expected_mr_enclave.
Operation:
(1) Let agent_id = hash(agent_pk).
(2) Verify that at least k leases ℓid [i] have:
(a) Correct signature (with respect to adm_pk[i]).
(b) id = agent_id.
(3) Verify the signature of ias_report using ias_pk.
(4) Extract the quote q from ias_report and verify that:
8Asmentioned in Section 6, since we use Elliptic-Curve’s keys for the agent’s key-pairs,
such computation of shared secret key can be based on the Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Helman
(ECDH) computation.
(a) q.user_data = agent_id.
(b) q.mr_enclave = expected_mr_enclave.
Sender Agent: Receiver Agent:
Input: (pks , sks ), ias_reports ,
leasess , econf_key
Input: (pkr , skr ), ias_reportr ,
leasesr
1) Send pub_infos :=
(pks , ias_reports , leasess )
←−→ Send pub_infor :=
(pkr , ias_reportr , leasesr )
2) Run VerPubInfo(pub_infor , Run VerPubInfo(pub_infos ,
self_mr_enclave) self_mr_enclave)
3) k := SharedKey(sks , pkr ) k := SharedKey(skr , pks )
4) Send enc_key, where
enc_key := Enck (econf_key).
−−→ 5) econf_key :=
Deck (enc_key)
Figure 4: Transfer of econf_key between Cluster Agents
5.1.3 Client - EConfidante Agent Interactions.
A client is a user of the EConfidante system that wants to interact
with an EConfidante agent. In the MeToo use-case, this interaction
is the reporting of a complaint. We describe the flow of a client that
sends sensitive data to an EConfidante agent, which in turn stores
it in the Ledger. The client connects to one of the EConfidante
writer agents, and requests the agent’s agent_pk, its ias_report and
leases. After the client verifies these, it generates an authenticated
secure channel with the enclave and sends the data through it. The
EConfidante agent re-encrypts the data using the econf_key and
writes it to the Ledger. Finally, after the agent verifies that the data
was registered in the Ledger, it sends an acknowledgment to the
client on a successful write. Figure 5 gives a detailed description of
the protocol flow.
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Client: Writer Agent:
Input: data Input: sk, pub_info = {pk, .. },
econf_key
Ledger: L.
2) Run VerPubInfo(pub_info,
econf_mr_enclave).
←−− 1) Send pub_info
3) Generate key-pair
(pkc , skc ) and compute
k := SharedKey(skc , pk) and
enc_data := Enck (data)
4) Send (pkc , enc_data). −−→ 5) Set k := SharedKey(sk, pkc ) and
data := Deck (enc_data).
6) Insert Enceconf_key(data) into L.
8) Verify that
Deck (enc_ack) = success .
←−− 7) Send
enc_ack := Enck (success).
Figure 5: Receiving Sensitive Data from a Client.
5.2 The Immutable Ledger
Wehave two related reasons for using an immutable ledger. The first
is our necessity to maintain a distributed database that is consistent
across different users view and in particular cannot be changed or
rolled back to a previous state. The second is that Intel SGX cannot
prevent rollback of its storage state and is generally susceptible to
replay attacks.9
There are several know approaches to handle these issues, and
solving one issue will also help solving the other. For example, there
are several works that address the rollback issue by distributed trust.
For example, ROTE [43] distributes the state between a number
of enclaves, and Brandenburger et al. [24] relies on the clients of
the system to jointly maintain a small state. We also choose to
distribute state information and separate this responsibility from
the EConfidante enclaves. This choice is made since the enclave
technology is not essential to keeping a distributed state and having
the joint state handled outside the enclaves (and just verified in
the enclaves) relieves the enclaves from much of the complexity
in maintaining the ledger and keep their TCB as small as possible.
In our solution we create an administrator managed distributed
ledger ensuring the following key property: a state written and
acknowledged by the ledger is never erased. This in turn means
that any enclave (or any other entity) reading from the ledger will
never accept an old state (even if it was accepted before).
Using HyperLedger Fabric: Rather than building our own dedi-
cated solution for this, we use an existing blockchain infrastructure,
specifically, the HyperLedger Fabric project [5, 18] which is an open
source project targeted for enterprise blockchain applications. We
note that in a sense, the Fabric project is an overshoot for what
we are doing – it provides additional functionality that we do not
require such as transaction ordering and validation. However, it
presents an appealing development strategy for achieving the goals
9There is a limited support preventing rollback of SGX storage based on keeping a
monotonic counter in an on-board non-volatile memory [14]. However this currently
has some serious limitations such as hard limits on the number of updates to this
counter, bad performance and limited support across different OS and platforms.
that we need, mainly, immutability and security and it natively
handles membership services and networking.
We next describe our immutable ledger implementation based
on HyperLedger Fabric and describe the guarantees that it provides.
Fabric presents a hierarchical structure of organizations, each of
which maintains nodes consisting of peers and/or clients. The peers
are responsible for maintaining the ledger state, while clients are
hubs for handling requests (UPDATE and GET requests in our sce-
nario). Peers are programmed using so called chaincode which is
the logic of what forms a legal transaction and what operations
each transaction triggers. Bear in mind that Fabric is targeting
Blockchain applications so a typical chaincode deals with monetary
transactions, but the transactions for our use case are very simple
and basically amount to UPDATE which adds a new entry to the
ledger and GET which returns the current ledger state (this could
be a specific entry or returning the entire ledger). In addition, a dis-
tributed ledger has an associated endorsement policy which defines
what is the set of peers that is sufficient for achieving a consensus.
Examples of endorsement policies could be asking for at least a
majority of the peers, or at least one peer from any organization
(endorsement policies could vary for update vs. read operations).
The trust model: It should be noted that our trust model differs
fundamentally from what is typical in a standard fabric deployment.
In a typical deployment, each organization places full trust in the
peers and clients of that specific organization and builds its secu-
rity guarantees based on this local trust. In our case, on the other
hand, only the EConfidante enclaves are fully trusted. The other
entities in the system are susceptible to corruption, as is the net-
work connecting between these entities and the enclaves. The trust
assumption that we put is that at least k out of n administrators
are not corrupted, and therefore receiving an endorsement from k
entities belonging to different administrators is enough to establish
trust. Technically speaking, we define each administrator in the
EConfidante system as an organization in the HyperLedger Fabric
setting. This means that each administrator holds a root certificate
and from it can sign on certificates of peers and clients running
under its domain (each administrator can run any number of peers
or clients). The endorsement policy we require is to have at least 1
peer from n − k + 1 distinct organizations (administrators).
The ledger operation: In practice, the Fabric flow is that each
UPDATE to the ledger arrives at a fabric client which circulates
this update among the peers and collects a sufficient number of
endorsements to satisfy the endorsement policy. Each endorsement
is basically a signature of a peer on the content of the update. Once
enough endorsements are collected, they are packaged and sent to
an ordering service which verifies the endorsements, sets an order
to updates, signs off on it and resends the update to the peers to
be incorporated to their local storage. An ensuing GET follows
a similar flow in which a client requests endorsements from the
peers on their most recent state. This is depicted in Figure 6. Once
a sufficient amount of peers send endorsements to the same state,
then this state is returned.
In our trust model, the EConfidante enclaves are the only fully
trusted entities. All clients and peers could be potentially corrupted
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Figure 6: A typical get operation flow in the Ledger
and therefore any response from the clients or peers need to be
verified inside the EConfidante agent enclaves. Basically this means
that UPDATEs are issued by enclaves but performed by the agent
helper code and a Fabric client. However, this UPDATE command
is only acknowledge by the EConfidante agent by issuing a subse-
quent GET command that verifies that this UPDATE was indeed
committed to the ledger. The result of the GET command along
with all the endorsements from the peers are delivered back to the
enclave and endorsement’s validity is verified inside the enclave.
In addition, each GET request is accompanied with a nonce that is
generated inside the enclave. This nonce is an integrated as part
of the peer endorsements and allows the enclave to verify the live-
liness of the response (this is key to avoiding the aforementioned
rollback attacks).
6 IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented a proof of concept of the EConfidante system
including agents, administrators, clients and ledger. Our implemen-
tation was developed in a Linux Ubuntu release 16.04 environment
using the Intel SGX SDK for Linux version 2.0 and tested on a
Lenovo P50-series laptops with an Intel Core i7-6820HQ CPU @
2.70GHz and 32GB memory.
For the cryptographic operations we use SGXSSL, available at the
intel-sgx-ssl git repository[7]. For the hash function we use SHA256
and for the symmetric encryption operations, we use AES256-GCM
as an encrypt-then-mac method [21] to ensure authentication and
IND-CCA2 security of the encryption scheme. We implemented the
agent’s key-pair (agent_pk, agent_sk) using Elliptic-Curve 521-bit
(EC521) keys.10 We use elliptic-curve Diffie-Helman (ECDH) for
computing the shared-key as described in Figure 4 and 5, which re-
sults in a shared 256-bit symmetric key. In addition, we implemented
the administrator’s key-pairs (adm_pk[i], adm_sk[i]) using EC256
keys and for the administrator’s signatures we use the elliptic-curve
digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) with 256 bits.
Our overall enclave’s code consists of ≈ 1700 physical source
lines of code (calculated by sloccount), where the breakdown of the
lines of code of the main modules is described in Table 3.
In addition, Table 4 summarize the time for some of the main
tasks of the system. In our measures, we used a single machine
for the agents, clients and Fabric client processes, and a separate
10Although there are no known attack on EC256, we chose to use 521-bit for the agents’
keys in order to emphasize their sensitivity.
Module Lines of Code
Verifying cert_chain and signature 120
Verifying IAS-report 187
Initialization and Attestation 163
Key-Transfer Protocol 263
Lease Processing 177
Client’s Complaint Processing 180
Scanner functionality 245
Sealing 196
Logging 80
Table 3: Enclave’s Physical source lines of code.
machine (on the same local network) that locally emulates the
peers and orderer components of the HyperLedger Fabric in a
four peers configuration. Therefore, the measurements of the key-
transfer protocol and the client-agent protocol do not include any
networking overhead, while the ledger requests include almost
all of the networking overhead. Note that the attestation process
should only occur once in the lifetime of an EConfidante agent and
therefore its timing is not critical. The ledger time is the most time
consuming component of our design as it occurs on every complaint
report. Yet for the MeToo use case this is very manageable. For
more stressful workload, other strategies would be necessary, see
Section B.3 for an additional discussion.
Flow Time
Attestation Phase (including communication with IAS) 3 sec
Key-Transfer Protocol (no networking overhead) 50 ms
Client-Agent Protocol (no networking & ledger overhead) 25 ms
Ledger GET request 0.3 sec
Ledger UPDATE request 2.8 sec
Table 4: Measured time of the main flows
6.1 Some Implementation Challenges
Our experience with Intel SGX is that it is not easy to work with.
Many of the basic building blocks are either not ready or not appli-
cable to many applications. Other than the inherent limitations such
as memory limitations, linkage and porting of simple operations
to run inside enclaves are sometime very challenging. Approaches
such as [19, 29] make porting easier but at the cost of performance
and a significantly larger code base. We describe two examples of
challenges that we encountered in the work.
Enclave-to-Enclave attestation: Intel provides end-to-end exam-
ple code for the remote attestation process [2]. In their implemen-
tation, a client application verifies an enclave and establishes a
secure-channel with it using a so called trusted Service-Provider en-
tity. The main problem with this implementation is that it combines
both the verification of the enclave and the creation of secure-
channel in one protocol. This means that any new entity that wants
to establish a secure channel with the enclave needs to run the
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entire attestation process with the IAS again, or alternatively put
trust in the service provider. More importantly, it disallows mu-
tual attestation between two enclaves without trust in the service
provider. Instead, we create a simpler attestation code that runs the
attestation process with the IAS only once, producing a reusable
attestation report. This report can then be used to establish trust
and a secure channel with the enclave by any user that is familiar
with the IAS public key. A similar approach was recently imple-
mented for forming TLS channels with enclaves [39]. For our work
we also implemented a version of the attestation report verifica-
tion that runs inside an enclave, which allows a mutual attestation
between enclaves and the creation of a secure channel between
two enclaves, which is crucial for passing of the econf_key (See
Figure 4). Our implementation of attestation is open sourced and
available at (–blinded for submission–).
Intel’s Trusted-Time Restrictions: As mentioned in [3], trusted
services such as timer are not supported by the Intel SGX technol-
ogy itself. Instead, the Intel SGX software provides an implemen-
tation of SGX Platform Services that establishes a secure channel
with another component, called the Converged Security and Man-
agement Engine (CSME), which provides trusted time but is located
separately from the CPU. This is the mechanism that we use for
establishing time within enclaves (as part of the time leases mecha-
nism, see Section 5.1.1). Unfortunately, while Intel SGX is supported
in Xeon E3 platforms, there is no CSME support there as of today.
So until this limitation will be fixed, our current implementation
cannot be executed on Xeon E3 hardware.
7 RELATEDWORK
Enclaves for Secure Computation The notion of using SGX en-
claves as trusted neutral mediators between parties has been sug-
gested in a number of applications and we mention a partial list
here. Multiparty computation of specific machine learning func-
tions using SGX was studied by Ohrimenko et al. [45]. Two-party
secure computations where suggested by Gupta et al. [35]. Küçük
et al. [41] used enclaves as a trusted third party for a metering use
case. Secure multi-party computations were studied and formalized
in the context of SGX by Pass et al. and Bahmani et al. [20, 48]. Func-
tional encryption using SGX was studied by Fisch et al. (Iron) [33].
Princess [30] is a collaboration framework for analyzing rare dis-
eases using SGX for privacy preserving collaboration. [23] hide
chaincode operations inside a Blockchain environment. The above
studies differ from ours in that they don’t consider the enclaves
as data owners, but rather as temporarily given access to the data.
They also do not consider a cluster of enclaves. Perhaps closest
to our work is Iron [33], which does consider interaction between
enclaves in which one provisions the key to another which com-
putes a function (similar to our core-reader interaction). Their work
however focuses on emulating a Functional Encryption setting,
where there is a central trusted key authority.
There have also been works studying the use of an enclaves for
securing sensitive data in various applications. SecureKeeper [27]
implements a secured version of Zookeeper in which, like our
solution, a number of enclaves store the data using one common
secure key. However, unlike our work, this key is provisioned by a
central trusted authority. Brekalo et al. and Krawiecka et al. [26, 40]
use enclaves to improve the security of password repositories using
techniques that are specific to this use case. Enclaves have also
been used by SGX-Log [38] to improve the reliability of logging
mechanism.
Rollback prevention in enclaves: There have been several ap-
proaches to preventing state rollback for enclaves. ROTE [43] uses
a cluster of enclaves that communicate to maintain state, while
[24] distribute this task among clients of a service. [23] addresses
rollback issues within a HyperLedger Fabric cluster and builds on
trust within this framework. Our approach is close but builds on
an administrator lead ledger to ensure both a consistent joint state
(that also cannot be rolled back).
Alternative approaches to the MeToo use case: As mentioned
in the introduction, Callisto [12] is an organization that imple-
mented the two-to-MeToo approach. Their initial deployment relies
on full trust in the administrators. Callisto has been working to
remedy this and have recently announced a new design [49] that
distributes some of this trust. This design uses a secure key service
holding a single key and a cryptographic primitive called OPRF so
that clients can register their encrypted complaints without the
key server learning it. The complaint is then registered with a DB
component. However, compromise of the key server renders their
implementation susceptible to enumeration attacks. Compromise of
the DB leaks information about whether matches occurred and may
be susceptible to erasure of old complaints. Our work presents a
stronger security notionWe view our work as complimentary, since
it provides additional and stronger security guarantees, and for in-
stance, we can use EConfidante like infrastructure to implement
the key server.
8 CONCLUDING REMARKS
We introduced the idea of autonomous data management by utiliz-
ing secure hardware such as Intel SGX and discuss its applicability
and merits for specific applications. Our work demonstrates such
a design is feasible and we build base tools to do this. We imple-
mented the system for the MeToo use case that achieves much
stronger security properties than previous designs and note that
each application requires tailoring according to its threat model
and security requirements. We believe this notion is a promising
building block for mitigating insider attacks in a wide range of
applications.
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A ON THE SECURITY OF ECONFIDANTE
in Section 4.1 we describe the general security goals and attributes
that our framework achieves. In the following we describe the
security guarantees that our design provides for the MeToo use
case (rather than a generic use case). Each guarantee depends on a
different set of assumptions and these will made clear.
We view the EConfidante system as an environment that includes
clients, administrators and an authority entity. The Clients report
complaints to the system and have only access to their view of the
protocol with the EConfidante enclave. Administrators have full
access to the network and nodes holding the enclaves. In addition
each administrator can view its secluded computation nodes that
include their respective secret key and their processes running the
Ledger code. Finally, the authorities receive a periodic encrypted
message from an EConfidante agent running in a scanner role.
Our guarantees rely on the following assumptions:
• Intel SGX HW is secure. Specifically it provides hiding of
all memory of its process and indeed runs the code with a
hash according to the attestation report.11
• the IAS public key is assumed to be public knowledge.
• The code compiled into econf_enclave.so indeed imple-
ments our design as stated, and the measurement of this
library econf_mr_enclave is assumed to be public knowl-
edge.
• The administrator’s public keys are assumed to be public
knowledge (this assumption is only critical for Property A.3
below).
Complaint secrecy:This is the most critical property that our
design aim to achieve. It basically says that complaints remain
secret even if all administrators are corrupted or hacked.
Property A.1 (Complaint secrecy). An adversary that can cor-
rupt all administrators cannot gain any (non-negligible) advantage
in distinguish a true complaint from a random complaint.
Matching complaints reporting:This property complements the
secrecy property with a guarantee on the actual functionality of
the system.
Property A.2 (Non-match Functionality). A complaint is
never included in the message to the authorities unless there was a
matching complaint against the same perpetrator. This holds also in
the presence of an adversary that can corrupt all administrators.
Property A.3 (Match Functionality). If a complaint was ac-
cepted by an EConfidante agent that matches a previous complaint,
that was accepted gainst the same perpetrator, then this match will
be included in the next message sent to the authorities. This holds as
long as at least k out of n administrators are not corrupted.
B ADDITIONAL IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
B.1 Ensuring Key and Data Survivability
An important attribute of our system is its ability to survive hard-
ware failures, and most crucially, not to lose the complaints data.
11Formal definitions of SGX HW security are complex and we refer the reader to
[33, 48] for examples.
Moreover, we want to enable the survivability property in face of a
denial of service attack, as long as enough administrators are not
corrupted. There are two aspects to this: First there is the encrypted
data in the ledger. This is straightforward to handle within the Hy-
perLedger Fabric framework. Since each administrator holds a copy
of the data, and can also replicate it by adding more peers (possibly
in remote locations), we can ensure the data will be retrievable by
at least k of the n administrators even in face of failures.
The second aspect is the key survivability, since the encrypted
data is useless without an enclave holding the econf_key. To this
end, we have multiple EConfidante agents in the system, some will
remain active even in face of hardware failures. In order to ensure
survival in face of an internal attack that erases all of the agents (e.g.
by a rogue administrator), we advocate that each administrator hold
a back up EConfidante agent in his personal domain. This backup
agent can receive leases just for the initial phase in which it obtains
the econf_key, and then its leases only need to be renewed in case
of loss of the other live agents. Note that leases can be renewed
after being stale. One subtlety is that the trusted time in an enclave
relies on a nonce which is retrieved during the attestation phase.
Yet, for an existing enclave, we added an API for retrieving the
trusted time from an agent whose leases are already stale. This
allows the revival of leases for agents whose hardware has been
upgraded and the time nonce has been changed.
B.2 Upgrading Agents
The ability to upgrade the enclave code is tricky. On the one hand
it undermines the entire security premise of the system – that
no human entity be able to retrieve the econf_key. This property
builds strongly on the fact that agent enclaves only hand out the
econf_key to other enclaves that run the exact same code. However,
in reality it is very likely that bug fixing or feature addition would
be required (even in the MeToo use case where the functionality is
very simple). To handle upgrades, one needs to build into the initial
enclave code an override in which if a sufficient number of special
leases are given to an enclave, then it can receive the econf_key even
with a different mr_enclave. Such a scenario should be very rare
and should require leases from more than the regular administrator,
e.g., have additional consent from high ranking managers in the
organization. The criteria for such a special upgrade should be
hardcoded in the enclave code.
B.3 Logging Mechanism
We implemented a trusted logging mechanism that tracks the en-
clave’s operations. More precisely, in each ECALL the agent-enclave
also returns a log record that contains a (trusted) time, message
and a signature over it’s new state, where the state is defined by an
aggregated hash over all previous log records. We consider three-
types of log messages: 1) An INFO message that notifies about an
event that occurred (e.g., the reception of a complaint). 2) A WARN-
ING/ERROR message that notifies about an unexpected behavior,
and 3) A PERIODIC message that the untrusted part periodically re-
trieves from the enclave (e.g., once an hour) using a special ECALL.
The untrusted part is responsible for writing these logs into a local
storage, where these logs are mainly used by the administrator’s
software for the decision of whether to renew the lease or not.
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For example, in our implementation, before renewing a lease of
an agent, the administrator’s software first verifies all signatures,
then it checks whether there are no ERROR messages and finally it
verifies that indeed there is a verified PERIODIC message in every
hour with respect the agent’s trusted time. Finally, it renews the
lease with respect to the trusted time that appears in the last log
record.
The logging mechanism described above has the limitation that
logs might be erased by an adversarial administrator. Such an era-
sure can be detected by the other administrators by monitoring that
there are no missing PERIODIC logs. In addition the administrators
need to ensure that the existing logs do not include indication of
an unexpected restart of the enclave, which is an indication of pos-
sible replay attack on the enclave. This serves as a mechanism to
detect foul play and not renew a lease accordingly. However, there
is no mechanism to retrieve the content of erased logs. For critical
information, we therefore advise to register it in the immutable
ledger, for which data is not lost as long as enough administrators
remain loyal. However, due to the performance limitations of the
ledger, the amount of log data added to the ledger should be limited
and contain only critical information. One example is to log every
restart of an enclave to the ledger so that multiple restarts can be
avoided.
B.4 Scanner Agent
As mentioned in Section 4.2, the scanner agent is responsible for
performing a periodic scan on the encrypted complaints in the
ledger for finding matches. We implemented a naive scanner that
maintains inside the enclave’s memory a map table M that maps
a perpetrator-id to the complaints it appears in, together with a
list R that contains all the perpetrator-id’s that has (potential) new
match. On every scan, the agent requests for the entire content
of the ledger using a GET request. Then, using the econf_key, the
enclave starts to decrypt each encrypted complaint from the point it
stopped the previous scan. On every decrypted complaint, it extracts
the perpetrator-id and the user-id and updates the corresponding
entry inM (i.e., updates the relevant entry inM in case there is no
previous complaint on perpetrator-id from the same user-id). In
case of a match, the enclave inserts perpetrator-id into R. At the
end of the scan, the enclave prepares a report including all matches
in R and encrypts it for the authorities (using an additional hard-
coded authorities public-key). The report is always prepared and is
of a fixed size, even if R is empty (i.e., no new match was found).
This makes report that contains matches indistinguishable from
an empty report. Once the report is sent, the enclave prepares a
special encrypted record and the agent inserts it to the ledger using
the UPDATE request. This special record includes an indicator of
the last complaint that was scanned for matches so that a future
scan would not repeat old matches. Observe that in case of a large
amount of complaints, the mapM might be large and might exceed
the size of the enclave’s page cache (128MB). In such case, the
scanning will be more time consuming due to paging overhead.
Since this process is done offline (and once a day), this potential
overhead is not significant to our system.
B.5 About the IAS Report
The IAS’s public-key ias_pk is of type RSA3072 and appears as part
of their attestation CA-certificate (PEM format). This certificate
is published at Intel’s website and is sent to any new user as part
of the registration process. In our implementation, the IAS-report
consists of three fields that are actually contained in any response
from IAS. The fields are: report_body (≈ 1KB), cert_chain (≈ 3.5KB)
and signature (≈ 350 bytes). The report_body is in JSON format.
It has many variables, including the variable “isvEnclaveQuote-
Body” which contains the quote in (URL-safe) base64 format. The
cert_chain can be verified using Intel’s public CA-certificate, and
it contains an RSA2048 public-key. Finally, the signature that has
been taken over the report_body, can be verified using the RSA2048
public key. See [1] for more details about IAS.
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